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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
against the desire and need for stability and efficiency with re-
gard to transfers of commercial documents. The uniform laws
were adopted to fulfill these needs with a minimum of formality.
,Nor should the absence of a notarial act arouse fear that the
donor will not be protected against fraud and coercion. The
Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides such protection by allow-
ing rescission in the event an endorsement or delivery has been
made under fraud, mistake, or duress.57
Fred Sutherland
PRESCRIPTION OF A CREDIT CARD PURCHASE
Suit was filed by a credit card corporation to recover a sum
of money allegedly due for cardholder's purchases made seven
years before from various business establishments. Defending
cardholder answered, alleging that the credit card purchase was
an open account and thus prescriptible in three years. No pay-
ments had been made between purchase and suit. Held, that the
prescriptive period of three years was applicable, and that since
the plaintiff was an assignee, the period had run. Carte Blanche
Corp. v. Pappas, 216 So.2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
* Credit cards are a modern phenomenon,' and their increasing
use has recently caused considerable debate as to the exact legal
nature of the credit card transaction.2 In the instant case, the
main question confronting the court was the classification of the
cause of action arising from a credit card purchase. It is settled
that the prescriptive period for an obligation arising ex contractu
is generally ten years,8 and because there was a written contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant it could be argued that
a ten-year period would be applicable. On the other hand, the
prescriptive period for an open account, which is also an obliga-
57. LA. R.S. 12:630 (1950).
1. The first case dealing with a credit card was Wanamaker v. Megary,
24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915). One of the best known credit card
plans, Diners' Club, was founded in 1950. In 1964, there were approximately
70 consumer credit card plans in the United States. By 1967, the number
of plans had Increased to about 1,000. Wall Street Journal (Midwest Edition),
Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
2. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 485 (1967); Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VALPARAISO U.L. RmV. 218 (1967); Comment, 48
CALIF. L. RaV. 459 (1960); Note, 35 NOTE DAME LAw. 225 (1960).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544: "In general, all personal actions, except those
before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years."
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tion arising ex contractu, is three years.4 In view of this specific
provision in the Civil Code that "accounts" are prescribed in three
years, and numerous decisions holding likewise,5 the court cor-
rectly decided this important issue.
It is less certain, however, that the credit card transaction
should be treated as the "assignment" of an open account from
the merchant to the credit card corporation. Although courts of
other jurisdictions have used this theory to explain the three-
party relationship,6 there has been strong and well-reasoned
criticism of these decisions. 7
To analyze this criticism, it is first necessary to understand
the credit card plan, which involves one card issuer, many card-
holders, and many merchants. When a single purchase is made by
means of the card, three contracts are involved. The agreement
between the issuer and the cardholder provides that the latter will
pay the former for purchases made by means of the card at ap-
proved stores, until notice of loss or theft of the card is received
by the issuer. In exchange, the issuer promises to render monthly
statements to the cardholder and to pay in his behalf all purchas-
es made through the use of the card.8 The second agreement-be-
4. Id. art. 3538: "The following actions are prescribed by three years:
"That on the accounts of merchants, whether selling for wholesale or
retail.
"That on all other accounts.
"This prescription only ceases from the time there has been an account
acknowledged in writing, a note or bond given, or an action commenced."
5. E.g., United Carbon Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Co., 230 La. 709,
89 So.2d 209 (1956); Frierson Co. v. Murray, 190 So. 132 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1939); Antoine v. Franichevich, 163 So. 784 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935), af'd,
184 La. 612, 167 So. 98 (1936).
6. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams' Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790
(1945); Union Oil Co. v, Lull, 220 Ore. 112, 349 P.2d 243 (1960); Diners' Club,
Inc. v. Whited, Civ. No. A 10872, Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 6, 1964, cited in
Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 485 (1967).
7. Note, 35 NOTRE DAMz LAW. 225 (1960); Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 150 (1960).
See also United States v. Golden, 166 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Texaco,
Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc.2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962), af'd, 39 Misc.2d 552,
241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1963). Both base their holdings, not on the assignment of
an account, but on the fact that there Is a contract between the issuer and
the cardholder which imposes obligations upon each party.
8. A typical agreement may be seen on a Louisiana BankAmericard ap-
plication: "The BankAmericard applied for herein is to be the property of
the Bank. By retention or use of the card, holder named, and all users there-
of, agree to be bound by the rules forwarded with the card and as follows:
(1) to assume responsibility for credit extended by the Bank on the basis
of the card; (2) to pay, at such place as this Bank designates, obligations
evidencing such credit, and service charges where applicable, in accordance
with billings and the current Customer Payment Schedule, including a rea-
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tween the issuer and the merchant-obligates the latter to honor
the card and to sell to the issuer all "charge slips" or "accounts"
which evidence sales made to cardholders. In return, the issuer
pays the merchant for the cardholder's purchases, less a dis-
count of the gross amount of such "charges."" The third contract
is the sale between the cardholder and the merchant.
The "assignment theory" attempts to explain the credit card
plan by focusing attention on this last contract, that of sale be-
tween cardholder and merchant.' 0 Once a sale has been made, the
merchant is said to "assign" the account to the credit card corpor-
ation. The difficulty with this theory is that it ignores the two
previous contracts entered into among the parties. When one
looks at the tripartite relationship, it becomes apparent that the
cardholder never expressly obligates himself to pay the mer-
chant. A credit card sale is accomplished by the merchant's mere
acceptance of the card, preparation of a cash sales slip, and then
forwarding this slip to the issuer. In short, once there has been a
sale, the cardholder is obligated to pay the issuer, not the mer-
chant, so that no rights are acquired by the merchant which can
be "assigned" by the merchant to the issuer.
A second explanation of the credit card transaction is the
"direct obligation" theory, which recognizes that because of the
three contracts there is a direct obligation existing between each
of the three parties. The focal point in the cardholder-issuer
relationship is their original contract and not the sale. By ob-
serving that the merchant parts with goods relying on the issuer's
promise to pay rather than the buyer's, this second theory ex-
plains more completely the actual workings of a credit card pur-
chase. In effect, the buyer's open account is not with the mer-
chant, but with the issuer. Certainly, an account with the issuer
was actually contemplated by the cardholder when he entered
sonable attorney's fee in the event of suit; (3) to notify Bank promptly in
writing of loss of the card; (4) the card may be cancelled by the Bank at
any time without notice; (5) to surrender the card upon demand; (6) to
waive and release Bank from all defenses, rights and claims holder may
have against any merchant or company honoring the card; (7) any claim of
Bank against holder shall at Bank's option become immediately due and
payable if holder fails to perform any terms hereunder or make any pay-
ments as otherwise agreed; (8) all transactions involving credit extended by
Bank on basis of the card shall be controlled by the laws of Louisiana which
are hereby expressly adopted to control all transactions hereunder."
9. The discount for bank credit card plans average under 3%. See
Taylor, On the Road to a Cashless Society, CONTEMPORARY MAGAZINE (pub-
lished by the Denver Post, Inc.), July 14, 1954, condensed in READER'S DIGEST,
August, 1968, at 187.
10. The terms "assignment theory" and "direct obligation theory" were
coined In Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1966).
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into the contract with it. Because there is still an open account,
the three-year prescription period remains applicable."
The "direct obligation" theory has the advantage of per-
mitting a separate analysis of each of the three contracts in the
credit card plan. The legal relationship existing between the
cardholder and the issuer in many respects resembles that of
mandate, with the issuer serving as mandatary for the card-
holder. The issuer acts for the cardholder by paying the latter's
charges at approved stores; 12 the issuer is bound to render a
monthly accounting to the cardholder; 1 3 the cardholder is re-
quired to reimburse the charges made by the issuer incurred in
the execution of the contract;' 4 and the relationship can be termi-
nated at the will of the credit card company or the card holder.'5
Nonetheless, one difficulty with this analogy is that Louisiana de-
cisions require that the principal exercise control over the
agent.'6 In actuality, the credit card company is the initiating
and dominating party, and it might be questioned whether the
cardholder controls the credit card company. On the other hand,
it can be argued that the cardholder does exercise this control, in
view of the fact that he can either make purchases or not, thus
either obligating or not obligating the issuer to act.
With regard to the issue of prescription, the importance of
using the direct obligation theory rather than the assignment
theory lies in fixing a starting point for the running of time. If
the credit card transaction is viewed as the assignment of the
merchant's rights to the issuer, prescription starts at the moment
the merchant could collect from the cardholder. Since an assignee
obtains no better rights than the assignor," prescription would
11. Reddick v. White, 46 La. Ann. 1198, 15 So. 487 (1894). Speaking of
the application of the three-year prescriptive period to accounts for goods
sold, the Court said "that prescription refers to accounts for goods sold, and
merchants' accounts against their customers, and generally to those business
or other relations in which accounts are usually rendered." Id. at 1207, 15
So. at 490.
12. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2985: "A mandate, procuration or letter of
attorney is an act by which one person gives power to another to transact
for him and in his name, one or several affairs."
13. Id. art. 3004: "He is obliged to render an account of his manage-
ment, unless this obligation has been expressly dispensed with in his favor."
14. Id. art. 3022: "The principal ought to reimburse the expenses and
charges which the agent has incurred in the execution of the mandate, and
pay his commission where one has been stipulated."
15. Id. art. 3027: "The procuration expires:
"By the revocation of the attorney . .. ."
16. White v. Hudspeth, 147 So.2d 874 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
243 La. 1018, 149 So.2d 768 (1963); Donovan v. Standard Oil Co. of La.,
197 So. 320 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); Graham v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,
171 So. 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
17. Harris v. Westwood Homes, Inc., 191 So.2d 702 (La. App. 4th Cir.
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run against the credit card company even in the interim between
the sale and the notification thereof to the issuer. This effect of the
assignment theory seems unfair. After all, it is the issuer who will
suffer from the merchant's delay. Using the assignment approach,
it is theoretically possible that the issuer could lose his action
against the cardholder without even knowing that a sale had
been made. On the other hand, the insertion in most merchant-
issuer contracts of a relatively short time period within which
the merchant is required to notify the issuer of the sale lessens
this possibility.'8
The direct obligation theory allows the use of a more equita-
ble starting point for the running of the prescriptive term. As
mentioned earlier, this second approach recognizes that the card-
holder has an open account with the issuer and that a three-year
prescriptive period is applicable. As to the starting point for
this period, it ideally should commence when both parties are
certain of the exact amount of the indebtedness, for it is only at
that moment that the creditor has the opportunity to collect or
the debtor to pay. By Act 118 of 1852, the term for an open ac-
count commenced at the moment the articles charged were
furnished to the purchaser.'9 However, this act is no longer in-
corporated in the Revised Statutes, and the three-year term for
an open account now seems to begin as of the date of the entry
of the debit in the creditor's account book.20 The advantages of
using this starting point for the running of prescription in the
credit card plan, rather than the sale, would be many. The issuer
1966); Castille v. Glassell-Taylor Co., 18 So.2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 167, Comment 1 (1932); 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 892 (1951); S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 432 (1 vol. rev. ed. 1938).
18. In the Louisiana BankAmericard Member Agreement there is the
following stipulation: "Each sales draft and each credit voucher shall be
delivered to Bank not later than the third banking business day following
the date of issuance." Carte Blanche Corporation and American Express
each allow ten days for delivery. Diners' Club allows the submission of
credits for a period of thirty days after their issuance.
19. La. Acts 1852, No. 118, § 1: "That the accounts of retailers of pro-
visions and liquors, and the accounts of all merchants, whether selling for
wholesale or retail, within this state, shall be prescribed by the lapse of
three years, from the time the articles charged shall have been furnished to
the purchaser .... "
20. Although no case could be found directly on point, the following
cases use this starting point in their reasoning: Sleet v. Sleet, 109 La. 302,
33 So. 322 (1903); Frieburg v. Rembert, 213 So.2d 104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968);
In re Succession of Magee, 79 So.2d 137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); Deluxe
Filling Station v. Mee, 152 So. 784 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Holmes Co. v.
Hiller, 7 La. App. 590 (1928); Harper v. Barton, 2 La. App. 317 (1925).
If credit or credits are entered subsequent to the last debit entry, then
the three-year term begins as of the date of the last credit entry. Ritchie
Grocer Co. v. Dean, 182 La. 518, 162 So. 62 (1935); Frieburg v. Rembert, 213
So.2d 104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Frierson Co. v. Murray, 190 So. 132 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1939).
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would not be threatened with the loss of all or part of his action
against the cardholder without even knowing that a sale had
been made. Since the cardholder would not be forced to pay the
issuer until the former received his monthly statement, the card-
holder's rights would not be unduly prejudiced. At the same time,
if the cardholder desired to make an earlier payment, he would
at least know the amount of such payment, as evidenced by the
receipt he is given for each of the purchases. If the relationship
between the cardholder and the issuer were treated as one of
mandate, the same three-year period and starting point would
be applicable. The cardholder-principal would simply have an
open account with the issuer-agent: 21 a relationship which ap-
pears to have been contemplated by the Civil Code.22
The selection of either the assignment theory or the direct
obligation theory is important for a second reason. The appro-
priate classification of the credit card transaction determines the
defenses and counterclaims available to the cardholder. 23 Under
the assignment theory the principles of assignment would de-
termine the cardholder's rights against the issuer. Since an as-
signee obtains no greater rights than the assignor,24 the card-
holder could assert any defense against the issuer which he could
have asserted against the merchant. As to counterclaims avail-
able to the cardholder,2 5 a distinction arises depending upon
whether the contract was formed in Louisiana or elsewhere. If
the contract were made in this state the obligor could assert those
counterclaims against the assignees which arose prior to the
obligor's receiving notice of the assignment.26 If the contract
were formed outside this state, which is quite likely due to the
21. The claim of an agent against his principal is generally treated as a
contract for services prescribed in ten years. Masset v. Baldwin Piano Co.,
186 La. 356, 172 So. 418 (1937); Millaudon v. Lessups, 17 La. Ann. 246 (1865);
Cooper v. Harrelson, 12 La. Ann. 631 (1857). However, if the principal main-
tained an open account with the agent, then a three-year prescriptive
period would seem to be applicable.
22. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3004.
23. For an excellent discussion of the effect of the two suggested
theories on available defenses and counterclaims, see Comment, 48 CAMP. L.
REv. 459 (1960).
24. See cases cited note 17 supra.
25. 4 A. CoRsIN, CONTRACTS § 896 (1951): "When we say that a defendant
has a counterclaim, we mean that the plaintiff has committed a breach of
duty to the defendant. Each party has done wrong; each is entitled to a
remedy, although there must be an adjustment of remedies."
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2212: "The debtor, who has accepted purely and
simply the transfer which a creditor has made of his right to a third person,
can no longer oppose to the latter the compensation which, before the ac-
ceptance, he might have opposed to the former.
"As to the transfer which has not been accepted by the debtor, but
1969] NOTES
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enormous size of many of the credit card plans, the cardholder
could assert against the issuer all counterclaims, regardless of
when notice was received, with one exception: the cardholder
could not assert those counterclaims which matured after re-
ceipt of the notice, if the origin of the counterclaim was a col-
lateral transaction.27
If the direct obligation theory were accepted, the defenses
and counterclaims available to the cardholder are not clear. In
regard to possible defenses, it has been suggested that the card-
holder's promise to pay the issuer should be interpreted as con-
ditional, the performance of which is dependent on satisfactory
completion of the sales.28 Thus, if defective goods were sold, the
cardholder would be able to assert this defense against the issuer.
This analysis of the cardholder's obligation is largely the result
of policy considerations, which recognize the fact that the issuer,
equipped with vast resources, would have a greater chance of
recovering from the merchant than the cardholder.29 However, it
is questionable whether this analysis should be accepted. It would
seem better to interpret the cardholder's promise to pay the
issuer as unconditional. If defective goods were sold, the card-
holder would still be able to seek relief from the merchant. Al-
though this second interpretation could cause a loss to the card-
holder-for example, if the merchant went bankrupt after selling
defective goods-the cardholder would be in no worse position
than if he had made his purchases without the card. If the issuer
was viewed as a mandatary, he would be able to assert some de-
fenses, but only those based upon the issuer's fault or neglect.80
An example of this neglect would be the issuer's approval of a
merchant whose reputation for the sale of faulty goods was
notorious. In regard to counterclaims, the direct obligation theory
has the advantage of disallowing the cardholder any counter-
which has been notified to him, it hinders only the compensation of credits
posterior to that notification."
. Thus, the cut-off for the assertion of counterclaims against the assignee
is the receipt by the obligor of notice of the assignment. Falls, Howell & Co.
v. Thorns & Powell, 22 La. Ann. 173 (1870); Gray v. Trafton, 12 Mart. (O.S.)
702 (1823); P. P. Williams & Co. v. Roach, 125 So. 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
27. 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 896, 897 (1951); Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
459 (1960).
28. Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1960).
29. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 485 (1967).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3003: "The attorney is responsible, not only for un-
faithfulness in his management, but also for his fault or neglect.
"Nevertheless, the responsibility with respect to faults, is enforced less




claims against the issuer which he might have been able to
assert against the merchant. 81 A counterclaim is based upon a
breach of duty by both the plaintiff and the defendant. In such a
situation, it would be more equitable to force the cardholder to
seek relief by asserting this counterclaim against the merchant,
rather than burdening the innocent issuer with troublesome
litigation.
Although few credit card suits have arisen,3 2 an increasing
use of credit cards will certainly occur.3 3 For this reason, an
accurate understanding of the nature of the credit card transac-
tion is essential. Unfortunately, most of the merchant-issuer
contracts speak of the "assignment" of the "invoices" to the
credit card company. Nevertheless, this language could be best
understood by viewing this transfer, not as the assignment of a
right which never existed, but merely as the "assignment" of the
invoice itself, necessary for the workings of the plan.
In the instant case, regardless of whether the court had used
the assignment or direct obligation theory, prescription would
have run. For cases arising in the future, however, it would be
more realistic to focus attention on all three contracts entered
into in the credit card relationship, and not merely on the sale.
As to the loss of the issuer's action against the cardholder be-
cause of liberative prescription, the credit card company will
receive better protection at no substantial sacrifice of the card-
holder's rights. In addition, recognition of the direct obligation
between the cardholder and the credit card company has the
advantage of allowing the cardholder to assert neither defenses
nor counterclaims against the issuer, unless the issuer were to be
considered the cardholder's mandatary. If this last relationship
were to be accepted, then the cardholder would be able to assert
those defenses based only upon the issuer's fault or neglect.
Paul Spaht
31. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 896 (1951): "When we say that a defendant
has a counterclaim, we mean that the plaintiff has committed a breach of
duty to the defendant." (Emphasis added.) Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459,
472 (1960): "A counterclaim must be based upon a cause of action which
could have been brought against the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
32. An explanation of this fact is the low percentage of defaults as well
as the reluctance of issuers for reasons of public relations to sue. In fact, up
to 1966, there had been only twenty reported cases Involving credit cards.
Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. &
COMM. L. REv. 485 (1967).
33. See generally Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized
Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811 (1967); Toward a Cashless
Society, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 5, 1965, at 97.
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